

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 6, Folder 10

January 7, 1953 -
March 7, 1953

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Box 6
Incoming Personal, 1953

Admiral Hewitt, 17 February 1953. Extensive comments on
Battle analysis--very informative.

Dear Rafe, Foreign Service, American Embassy, Admiral Spruance,
27 April 1953. Comments on Philippine situation and
elections.

My Dear Rafe, Admiral Carney, CNO, 19 August 19 3
Great comments on morale

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JOHN J. BERGEN
40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK 5, N.Y.

7 January 1953


Dear Rafe:

In a telephone conversation with Dick Conolly this morning, he told me that you would both be here on the 29th. It occurred to me that you and Dick might like to attend the Second Panel Sheriff's Jury dinner which will be held at the Biltmore Hotel, Wednesday, 28 January. It is a splendid gathering of some of the top names of New York, and I am sure that you and Dick will enjoy it; so, I have arranged for both of you to be my guests on that evening, and have made reservations for you at the Pierre Hotel for the 28th and 29th.

Please excuse my haste as I am about to shove off to Rochester, Minnesota, to see my friend, Gene Garey, who is very ill at the Mayo Clinic. Will be in touch with you on my return.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jack", with a large, stylized flourish extending from the bottom of the name.

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

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Our House
Lanes, S. C.

Jan. 5th 53.

Dear Betsy.

I received your air mail letter here and hasten to reply. The directions which you quote that I gave were made from the study of an old chart at the Club. Perhaps the chart of today will not coincide. I appreciate your interest and effort tremendously.

The President of the Swan Island Club is Edwin Arnold, of Arnold Hoffman & Co, 55 Canal St. in Providence. He can give you all the dope, if you felt inclined to phone him, and if you care to pursue it. But I hate to give you all this trouble, and am sorry that my description of locality was in error. I know that a correct aerial map would be very valuable to us at this time due to litigation, but don't bother any further. Please thank all concerned for me.

We have had good quail shooting

and lots of fun here. But last night we all
got gay and went corn hunting in the
swamps. I fell into a deep hole
under water and almost broke my
leg at the knee. So today I am sitting
it out in the club house while everyone
is out having a good time. To hell
with corn hunting anymore!

I return to N.Y. for a few days
on Sunday, then join Ned out West.
Our address there is Route #2. Box 70F
Scottsdale, Arizona. I hope you are
well, enjoying life as usual, & that you
will be there when we return in May.
My best to Willy & all the boys in
the R.P.

As always -

Ted.

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ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.
FORETOP
ORWELL, VERMONT

Jan. 9, 1952.

Dear Rafe:-

We too were sorry not to have seen something of you during our Newport visit, and we were particularly sorry for the reason. You had our deepest sympathy.

We are planning to leave for Annapolis on Monday, if the weather will let us, and to be there until mid*April. I do have quite a few friends there, and it will undoubtedly be quite enjoyable. But I hope, among other things, to get a little work done. The Naval Institute is pushing me for some real articles on Sicily, Salerno, et al. The tenth anniversaries of the first two come up next summer.

Glad you liked my little anecdote. Ship-mate wanted a long article from me on anything I chose, but I said I didn't have time right now, but they could that if they wished. It was something I wrote up for the Swedish "Society of the Men of 1887" of which I am an honorary member, so I had it handy. Ralph Parker, who was a ship-mate of mine at the time wrote it up some years ago in the Naval Institute but without any names. The yarn is absolutely true. Admiral Schroeder was the Admiral, Bill Rush was the Captain, and Admiral McNamée (who just died) was the Exec.

I haven't yet had time to study the "Battle Lessons", but I promise to do so after I get to Annapolis, and to give you my thoughts on the subject. Thank you for sending it to me.

With best wishes to you, and hopes that, in spite of the circumstances, you did have a pleasant holiday,

Sincerely yours,

H. Kent Hewitt

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Headquarters
TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
San Juan, Puerto Rico

21 January 1953

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, U.S.N. (Ret)
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Admiral Bates:

Three weeks have passed since mailing off to you the story board on the Battle of Savo Island. Although my comments on the story board were completed at that time, it has not been possible to get my notes typed out until we settled down to complete our report. We have been on the move continuously, and writing day and night including Saturdays and Sundays.

But, I finally got my notes typed out and am mailing them to you today via air mail. You may be sparked into better ideas than my suggestions have to offer. These things take a lot of thought, as we both know. So, if I can be of further assistance to you in any way, I will be glad to help out by wedging it in some way or other.


Our next survey trip starts about mid-February in the 14th Naval District, and will take us out to the Marshall Islands in the process.

A note came from our Pentagon Office, stating you had called, but would write me a letter.

Trusting you are well and in fine spirits after the trip to California. Frances is basquing at West Palm Beach, Florida while I am in the tropics. So perhaps everyone is having sunshine all around.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Very sincerely yours,


W. D. INNIS

P.S. Please tell Cavanaugh I didn't have the heart to send my rough pencilled notes on the story board for him to type up, for even I can't read my writing when it is cold.



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COMMANDING OFFICER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

January 30, 1953

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN(Ret)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Rafe:


I received Admiral Davis' letter to you concerning the photograph which you desired. The attached pictures of the Swan Island Hunting Club were taken on one of our routine photo flights. They were taken prior to the receipt of your letter of 7 January, but appear to fill the bill. I am forwarding the negative with the photographs.

If, when you receive word from the Swan Island Club, these pictures are not satisfactory, we can probably take another series of photographs when the specific information is available. This area contains several targets which we photograph from time to time, so that this request would not require a special effort on the part of the Naval Air Station.

I trust that these photographs will prove satisfactory to you and your friends.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,



Fitzhugh LEE
Captain, U. S. Navy

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COMMANDING OFFICER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

February 11, 1953

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN(Ret)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Rafe:

The photographs for use at the Swan Island Club marked RESTRICTED can very well be declassified and you may consider the RESTRICTED classification removed.

Compliance with the U. S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter calls for a "Declassified and Released" notation on the pictures. If you would kindly mark the photos, it will remove any doubt on the part of Mr. Grosvenor or others concerned as to the propriety of using the prints.

I heartily concur that the good will of our civilian friends can do a lot of good. I hope the photos will contribute in a small way towards fostering that feeling.

Sincerely,

SJL
Fitzhugh LEE
Captain, U. S. Navy

Photographs Downgraded To Unchass, Excl.
mb

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Typewritten copy
Filed in MSS COMMENTS File

ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.

FORETOP

ORWELL, VERMONT

235 King George St.,
Annapolis, Md.
Feb. 17, 1953

Dear Rafe: - This is necessarily written without the use of a typewriter, because I am sitting over in the hospital while they give me a routine checkup. Nothing particularly wrong - just taking advantage of the opportunity. Hope you'll be able to read my long hand.

I apologize for the delay in sending you my comments which you so kindly requested. It has just been one thing after another around here, and I haven't been able to get to it. I haven't even done much re my 50th Anniversary article on Husky and Aralanche which the Institute has been after me for.

As I read through your

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lessons, I made some pencil marginal notes for my own later reference. I'll leave them for you to see, but will now go into a little more detail.

1. I do not agree that it was not necessary for Com Third Flt to inform Comsorspac or CTF 77 that he had selected a new task other than his covering task. If 3d Flt was not continuing its covering task, CTF 77 (& Comsorspac) had every right to know it - since other dispositions by them might become necessary. A commander should always put himself in the position of his senior or a co-ordinating or co-operating and consider what he would want to know, were he in that position.

As to Lesson 1. I would say something to the effect that there should be one primary task, to which all others should be subordinated. With multiple tasks, an order of priority should be given.

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ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.

FORETOP

ORWELL, VERMONT

As to top of your page 2. I think that every commander, when faced with a new situation should be free, within his discretion, to take such action ^{without delay} as the situation may dictate, bearing in mind the over all purpose of the campaign. That is, he should not have to await permission or further instructions, to take timely action - but he should advise his senior or co-ordinating commander, at once, of his intentions.

2. No comment - except that I would say that a commander should never make an undesirable departure from the plan. A ~~departure~~ ^{action} which would better contribute to the over all purpose of the campaign would be a desirable one.

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3. There may be times when ^{simultaneously} a commander may operate, on a strategical or administrative, and on a tactical level. But from my experience, rarely can a commander wear two or more tactical hats effectively, even in peace time maneuvers. When a fleet commander, for instance, also endeavored to hold tactical command of the battle line, he usually slighted one or the other. I saw this often, in the old day. When, as a senior cruiser captain, I sometimes held command of a group of cruisers, I always got very excited to handle the ship, while I ran the division or section. When I was Ch of Staff for Admiral Tausig, who was both Comcruswr and Comcrudiv Force (I think it was), he always had me handle the division, while he directed

ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.

FORETOP

ORWELL, VERMONT

the cruisers as a whole. Based on this experience, I never let myself, in any of my major operations, get involved in direct command of any of my units. Thus, in the Morocco landing, I gave command of the Center Force to Emmett, although I was with that force myself. In this way, I was always able to give my attention to the operation as a whole, and was free to proceed to other areas if needed. But at the same time, my other job as Com Amphiblant was carried on by my C.O. S and the organization on shore at Ocean View.

Similarly, inside the Med, I was able to command the Western Naval Task Force, without slighting too much my other job of Com 8th Flt.

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Since practically all the mobile units of the 7th Flt & Naval Forces Soverpac must have been assigned to Task Force 77, and since there probably was no other qualified commander with adequate staff available, I see no reason why Kinkaid should not have been ^{both} Com Nav For Soverpac and CTF 77. But, in my opinion, it would have been undesirable for him to have been both CTF 77 and a commander of a unit of TF 77.

4. In my opinion, all submarines having the task of supporting the Leyte Gulf operation should have been under the commander of that operation. And their orders should have indicated in no uncertain terms that this was their primary task, and that the destruction of shipping, for the time being,

was secondary.

5. In planning, it is certainly true that full consideration should be given to enemy capabilities. If it is found impracticable to guard against all possible enemy courses of action, then the plan should be designed so as best to counter the most probable enemy course of action, as well that which, if adopted by the enemy, would most seriously oppose the execution of one's own task. It was unfortunate that more heed was not paid to enemy capabilities prior to Pearl Harbor.

6. Thoroughly sound. No comment.

7. It makes no difference what point of origin or system of co-ordinates is used in

reporting contact positions, so long as it is thoroughly understood and gives the commander the information he needs. In many cases, a position relative to one's own force may be preferable to a geographic position.

8. No comment - except, under Lesson, I wonder if the word "aircraft," as you use it, should not have a plural significance.

9. Lesson. This is, it seems to me, a military axiom, which should apply to all types of forces. There should always be no operation to attain a maximum concentration of effort against a major target.

10. No comment, except to call attention to my marginal note. My thought is that something might be effective (that is, contribute to a desired result) without necessarily attaining maximum effectiveness.

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ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.

FORETOP

ORWELL, VERMONT

11. See my marginal note. How often have aviators, even our own naval aviators, claimed results far in excess of the actual!!! Your remarks as to the great importance of correct information are most certainly to the point.

12. No comment - except my marginal note. Any commander finding himself unable to execute his task should immediately advise the commander who looks to him for its execution.

13. It is certainly important that an enemy force with which contact is made should continue to be observed. if the means are available. Perhaps, in this instance, the J-4 air was unable to track due to the effective work

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of our radar, and C.A.P.

14. How right you are!!
See my marginal comment on
page 18. The air should be
brought under command of
the commander of an operation,
as well as the ground and
naval forces. This never
happened in the Med - except
partially so in the Southern
France landing (Dragoon)

With respect to the selection
of a Commander of an Operation
it is desirable that he come
from the service having
paramount interest - but
this should not preclude
selecting the best available
man regardless of service.
And what about a shift in
command (and responsibility)
such as was employed in
all my major operations -
the Admiral commanding
and being responsible while
the forces were sea-borne and
being landed - and the General

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ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.
FORETOP
ORWELL, VERMONT

taking over when he gets his
feet firmly on the ground.
This worked without a
hitch, as far as my experience
goes.

The more I read about
Kurita (see the current Naval
Institute) the more vacillating
and indecisive I think he
was. He is given a task,
which ^{is} a desperate suicidal one
which is supposed to be carried
through regardless. Halsey hits
him hard and he turns around.
Prodded from the rear, he turns
around again. He runs into
Tom Kinkaid's escort carriers
and has them by the tail
and lets go of them. He says
he thought they were fleet carriers.
all the more reason for hold-

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on while he was hitting them. (They couldn't have been getting away from him at 18 kts) ! This was a case for a major decision by a commander faced with a new and unexpected situation, - a possibly diserable departure from plan.

But he lets go, and heads down toward his first objective. Then his staff gather around and tell him he ought to go after the task force to the northeastward (presumably, to him, the outfit he'd been in action with). So he agrees and turns around again once more. (I wonder if maybe his staff hadn't been telling him he shouldn't have let go of those carriers). But, he can't find them, and he's running out

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ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, U.S. NAVY, RET.

FORETOP
ORWELL, VERMONT

of fuel, so he turned for home -
to suffer more losses later,
having accomplished, from the
gap point of view, nothing.
A classic example of
marching up the hill, and
then down again.

Well - I've got to quit.
Best regards. Glad you en-
joyed the little article in
Ship-mate. They asked me for
something and I happened
to have that on hand, having
written it up for a Swedish
Society of which I am an
honorary member.

Sincerely yours
Kent Hewitt

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Dear Commodore -

Thought this might
interest you, even though the
printer didn't do so well on the
cut of the Admiral.

Also had some fun carrying
out a couple of compositions from
water color sketches of older times.

See nos. 11 & 12.

Thought of you during the
broadcast of the Lexte chapter of
"Victory at Sea". Excellent though
it was, it impressed on me how
synoptic such a thing is, for it

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was impossible even to suggest the nuances of that incredible story. Rodgers music was ideally good.

I certainly enjoyed my stay at the War College. The big trouble was that the portrait was so demanding that it wouldn't let me loose to take advantage of the interesting opportunities in things going on.

It was a great pleasure to work with you, and I am proud to be represented at the War College. Mr. McKean, head of the ancient house of Doll & Richards, is not free with his compliments.

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95 DUDLEY ROAD
NEWTON CENTRE 59, MASSACHUSETTS

but went a bit overboard on
the Admiral, considers it one of
my two best efforts in the field.

All best regards.

Dwight Shepler

P.S. Don't have lunch. Gary's first
name, would you be so kind as to
give this to him?

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

JAG:II:2:WEN:mk

19 FEB 1953

From: The Judge Advocate General
To: Commodore R. W. Bates, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Subj: Temporary employment as consultant on fee basis at Naval War College

Ref: (a) Your ltr of 5 Feb. 1953 to AJAG
(b) Reference Guide to Employment Activities of Retired Naval Personnel (Navy JAG, February, 1952)

Encl: (1) Copy of Comp. Gen. Decision B-103571 of October 8, 1951 (31 Comp. Gen. 126)

1. In reference (a) you inquire in effect as to whether your retired status and retired pay might be affected in the event you accept Federal civil employment at the Naval War College under a consultative contract providing for a stipulated per diem. You state that you were retired for physical disability incurred in line of duty. You further state that you have a copy of reference (b) which was heretofore issued by this Office as a reference guide with respect to the employment of retired naval personnel.

2. Since you were retired for physical disability incurred in line of duty, you are not subject to the restrictions contained in the Act of July 31, 1894, as amended (5 U.S.C. 62), the dual employment statute. That is, you are not prohibited by that statute from accepting civil employment under the Federal Government. (See pages 4 through 6 of reference (b)).


3. Since on the basis of reference (a) there is no indication that you were retired for disability "incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States" or that the disability for which you were retired resulted from "an explosion of an instrumentality of war", the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1932, as amended (5 U.S.C. 59a), the so-called dual compensation statute, would apply to your case. (See pages 6 through 9 of reference (b)). In this connection the Comptroller General of the United States held in enclosure (1) that the dual compensation statute applies, in the case of a retired naval officer intermittently employed as a consultant on a time basis, only on the days he receives compensation for his civilian position, and on all other days, including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, when he is not performing civilian duties, he is entitled to retired pay. Thus, it appears that

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on the basis of the facts disclosed in reference (a) you would be entitled to receive your retired pay from the Navy on those days when you are not actually employed as a consultant.

4. In reference (a) you also inquire as to the procedure for notifying the disbursing officer holding your retired pay accounts as to the days of your employment as consultant in order that that officer may accordingly adjust your retired pay. In the employment referred to in reference (a) you presumably would be paid on a public voucher by a disbursing officer at the Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, for the days on which employed as a consultant. You should request that disbursing officer to advise the Chief, Field Branch, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Cleveland, Ohio at the end of each month as to the dates you were actually employed as a consultant and for which you have been compensated in order that the disbursing officer carrying your retired pay accounts at the Field Branch may make proper deductions from your retired pay for that month.

5. As further indicated in reference (b) it is incumbent upon this Office to point out that the question of what civil employment and compensation a retired officer of the Navy may legally accept without prejudice to the rights and benefits of his retired status must be determined by the retired officer concerned on his own responsibility. The Attorney General of the United States has advised that it is not for the Department of the Navy to decide in any particular case whether the prospective employment of a retired officer would come within the prohibition of any statute.


IRA H. NUNN

Personal

Washington, D.C.

March 7, 1953

Commodore R. F. Bates, U. S. N., Ret.,

Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Sir:

May I respectfully inquire did the study consideration and evaluation of proposed naval tactics and strategy in the Pacific area during 1944 and 1945 of World War II which were received by the Navy Department from non-official sources during 1944 and 1945 come under the cognizance of any of the officers listed below which during 1944 and 1945 were under the jurisdiction of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., - Headquarters of the Commander in Chief - U. S. Fleet - Navy Department - Washington, D. C.

I list the officers in question as follows:

Commander-in-Chief - U. S. Fleet

Deputy Commander-in-Chief - U. S. Fleet

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff

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Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Combat Intelligence)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Readiness)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Anti-submarine)
Operational Proposals Board

It is my opinion that the study consideration and evaluation of proposed naval tactics and strategy in the Pacific area during 1944 and 1945 received by the Navy Department in correspondence from non-official sources during 1944 and 1945 did come under the cognizance and was the responsibility of the office of the "Assistant Chief of Staff (Readiness)" or the "Operational Proposals Board" ~~over~~ over which Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U.S.N., 1944 and 1945 Assistant Chief of Staff (Readiness) presided as Chairman, or both.

Also may I respectfully inquire who besides Admiral DeLany were the other members of the "Operational Proposals Board" and also was the "Operational Proposals Board" a separate office or a part of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff (Readiness)

Whatever information in answer to the above inquiries and in particular as to which office listed above did have cognizance of and was responsible for the study consideration and evaluation of proposed naval tactics and strategy in the Pacific area during 1944 and ~~1944~~ 1945 received by the Navy Department from non-official sources

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during 1944 and 1945 that you can supply me with will be appreciated.

And may I place special emphasis that I am especially and in particular interested in finding out to which of the offices as listed above was the study consideration and evaluation of proposed naval strategy in the Pacific area during 1944 and 1945 received by the Navy Department during 1944 and 1945 in correspondence from non-official sources assigned as its responsibility and cognizance.

In view that you are engaged on the analysis of naval actions of World War II it is sincerely hoped that you are in position to answer the inquiries herein.

Respectfully awaiting your reply.

Sincerely,

Lewis Karnick,
600 Tuckerman N.W.
Washington, D.C.

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